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INTRODUCTION
You have a U.S. patent covering invention X comprising three
components: A, B, and C, and assume the law only protects
inventions within the U.S. I would be infringing your patent if,
without permission, I used invention X within the U.S. But what if
invention X is partly inside the U.S. and partly outside the U.S.;
would I still be infringing? What if I export components A, B, and
C to Canada and make invention X in Canada; would I be
infringing then? Now assume that very scenario is illegal, i.e., it is
illegal to export components of a patented invention with the
intention of making the patented invention outside the U.S. What
if A, B, and C are lines of software code and your invention is a
video game and several hundred thousand copies are made in
Canada; would I be liable for every copy made? These scenarios
depict the cutting edge problems with determining the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law.
In 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated a long-established
principle: “[W]e . . . insist on a clear congressional indication of
intent to extend the patent privilege.”1 The Supreme Court’s
1

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972).
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statement was in response to the export of components for
combination outside the U.S.2 At issue was a patent that covered a
working machine, but the patent did not cover the components.3
The alleged infringer cleverly thought, and the Supreme Court
agreed, that he could export the components and complete the
machine outside the U.S. without violating the patent on the
machine because he did not “make” or “use” the machine within
the U.S.4 A few short years later, Congress passed legislation to
close this loophole,5 thus, making it illegal to supply components
for infringement (albeit actual infringement would occur outside
U.S. borders).6 When infringers subtly modify their behavior to
technically circumvent U.S. patent law and embarrass the spirit of
U.S. patent protection, how can courts offer protection while
abiding by the proscriptions against extraterritorial reach? Two
cases highlight this struggle.7 First, if the invention at issue is
located both outside and inside U.S. borders, such as a
transnational communications system, how do courts determine if
an alleged infringer actually “used” the invention within the U.S.?
Second, if the invention at issue is intangible and easily replicable,
such as software code, how do courts determine if an alleged
infringer actually “supplied” the components for the resulting
copies made outside the U.S.?
Part I of this Note discusses pertinent background including the
original presumption against extraterritorial effect, forms of
infringement, and types of patent claims. Part II discusses the two
leading cases interpreting the edges of extraterritorial reach.
Part III analyzes the Federal Circuit’s contextual approach in the
two leading cases on extraterritorial reach.

2

Id. at 523.
See id. at 528.
4
Id. at 528–29.
5
See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)).
6
Id. (referring to 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
7
See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
3
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I. BACKGROUND
Inquiry of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law begins
with the conceptual understanding of the Federal Circuit’s
contextual application of U.S. patent law. U.S. patent law can
have extraterritorial effect if the form of infringement and type of
patent, when combined, constitute territorial subject matter.8
Traditionally, U.S. patent law only affected acts within the United
States.9 Historically, the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted
statutes to apply exclusively to acts inside the United States, unless
Congress expressly stated otherwise.10 Courts have provided
extraterritorial effect to U.S. patents not by broadly interpreting the
Patent Act,11 but rather by broadening the concept of subject
matter considered to be inside the United States.12 Courts have
contextualized each infringement statute to the type of patent
claim.13 For example, “using” a patented invention within the
8

See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1316. “Not only will the analysis [of extraterritoriality] differ
for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ as the result of differences between
different types of claims.” Id. “Extraterritorial effect” or “extraterritorial reach,” as used
in this paper, refers to jurisdiction of U.S. patent law that extends beyond the territorial
bounds of the United States. “Territorial,” as used in this paper, refers to subject matter
considered within the United States. “Extraterritorial,” as used as an isolated term in this
paper, refers to subject matter considered beyond jurisdiction of U.S. patent law.
9
See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (describing patent holder rights
limited to the United States); Deepsouth Packing Co. 406 U.S. at 527 (citing 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a)). The Supreme Court held that manufacture and exportation of components for
completed assembly outside the United States did not constitute making the claimed
combination invention. Id. at 527–28; Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property
Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 513–16 (1997) (presenting five
justifications for a presumption against extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law:
international law, comity between nations, lex loci delicti, congressional intent, and
separation-of-powers). Bradley argued extraterritorial impact of U.S. law is a political
and foreign policy question reserved for the Executive and Legislative branches. Id. at
516.
10
See Bradley, supra note 9, at 510–12 (discussing that the Supreme Court construes
federal statutes to have only territorial effect) (citing Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)); see also Stanley Young, Global Aspects of United States
Patent Protection, 823 PLI/Pat 363, 376 (2005) (describing explicit and implicit
congressional intent underlying relevant statutes).
11
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (defining infringement).
12
See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1316.
13
See id. Although the Blackberry e-mail system had a network component in Canada,
the Federal Circuit held the system was territorial subject matter for U.S. patent law
because Blackberry users “used” the system within the U.S. Id. at 1317. The Federal
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United States violates 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). However, “use” of a
device differs from “use” of a process.14
Part A of this section discusses the origins of the presumption
against extraterritorial effect for U.S. patent law. Part B discusses
the various forms of infringement as a factor in determining
extraterritorial effect. Part C discusses various types of patent
claims as a factor in determining extraterritorial effect. Part D
discusses the interplay between the courts and Congress in honing
the edges of extraterritorial reach. Part E discusses jurisdiction.
A. Presumption against Extraterritorial Effect
Prior to the enactment of the modern statute for patent
infringement, the Supreme Court held “acts of Congress do not,
and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United
States . . . .”15 In 1856, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a
patentee’s rights over a French vessel temporarily docked at a
Boston port.16 In 1915, the Supreme Court refused to enforce a
patentee’s rights over grain drills sold in a foreign country despite
the fact that the drills were made in the U.S. because the seller only
purchased and resold the patented invention.17 After Congress
codified the modern-day infringement laws, the Supreme Court
remained steadfast to its longstanding tradition of viewing U.S.
patent law with a presumption against extraterritoriality and
Circuit held the Blackberry process was not territorial subject matter because users did
not “use” the process in the U.S. Id. at 1318 (discussing that a process is merely a series
of steps and the user did not complete the steps within the U.S. because one step occurred
in Canada).
14
See id. at 1316–18 (discussing difference between use of a system and use of a
process). To “use” a process in the U.S. all steps of the process must be performed
within the U.S. Id. at 1318.
15
Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (describing the presumption that rights
conferred on patent holders by Congress do not extend outside the United States); cf. Am.
Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (describing reasons for a presumption against extraterritorial
effect). The Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act did not apply to a U.S.
corporation operating in Panama and Costa Rica, because extraterritorial effect would be
“contrary to the comity of nations . . . .” Id.
16
Brown, 60 U.S. at 188 (stating holding).
17
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (stating
holding). The only act of infringement the defendant committed was selling the
invention and because the defendant sold the invention in Canada, the Supreme Court
held “[infringement] cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.” Id.
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refused to grant extraterritorial effect unless there was “a clear
congressional indication of intent to extend the patent
privilege . . . .”18
In 1856, in Brown v. Duchesne,19 the Supreme Court held that
an improvement aboard a French vessel did not infringe the U.S.
patent covering the improvement because the French vessel was
only temporarily in a U.S. port.20 The Alcyon, a French schooner,
sailed into Boston as part of a roundtrip voyage from St. Peters, a
French colony.21 The gaff saddle, a component of the schooner,
incorporated an improvement covered by the plaintiff’s patent.22
The builder of the schooner added the improvement prior to
launching the ship “in order to fit her for sea.”23 The lower court
held that the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s improvement
patent, and the plaintiff appealed.24
The Supreme Court inquired whether Congress intended for the
patent laws to supersede the Government’s power to make treaties,
particularly regarding international trade.25 The Court refused to
construct a statute that would “disarm the Government of [such] a
power . . . unless plain and express words indicated that such was
the intention of the Legislature.”26 The Court emphasized that the
exclusive right conferred on a patent holder concerned conduct

18

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972). For discussion
on Deepsouth, see infra Part I.B.1.
19
60 U.S. 183 (1856).
20
Id. at 188 (stating holding).
21
Id. at 193 (stating facts).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 194 (stating procedural history).
25
Id. at 195 (discussing separation of powers). Prior to turning to Congress’ intent
behind the patent laws, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant used
the improvement in the United States because the defendant only used the improvement
“on the high seas, and in other places out of the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at
196. The Court stated that making or selling the improvement in the United States would
constitute infringement, but because the improvement was a sail component, “the vessel
could hardly be said to use [the improvement] while she was at anchor in the port . . . .”
Id.
26
Id. at 195. The patent laws represented Congress’s power to regulate commerce and
“promote the progress of science and useful arts.” Id.
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solely “within the limits of the United States.”27 The construction
of the patent laws preferred by the plaintiff would confer upon the
patentee a power that could “seriously embarrass the commerce of
the country with foreign nations.”28 The Court held that Congress
did not contemplate nor intend this implication.29 Thus, the Court
held that patentee rights did not extend to foreign vessels lawfully
entering U.S. ports.30
The Court found a presumption against extraterritorial effect
because larger policy issues outweighed the rights of the
patentee—policy issues such as international trade, the Executive’s
power to negotiate trade treaties, and Congress’s lack of expressed
intent to frustrate the Executive’s treaty-making power.31
In 1915, in Dowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline
Plow Co.,32 the Supreme Court held that a patentee could not
recover damages for foreign sales of infringing grain drills made in
the U.S. because the location of sales controlled liability and
therefore sales in Canada were beyond the reach of U.S. patent
law.33 Plaintiff held a patent for an improvement of a grain drill,
and manufactured and sold grain drills with the improvement.34
27
Id. (describing rights of patent holders). “[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were
not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States . . . .” Id.
28
Id. at 197. Plaintiff’s construction of patent law would “confer . . . not only rights of
property, but also political power, and enable [patentees] to embarrass the treaty-making
power” of the Government and enable patentees to interfere with Congress’s power to
regulate commerce. Id.
29
Id. “We think these laws ought to be construed in the spirit in which they were
made . . . and should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases which
Congress evidently could not have contemplated.” Id. “[I]t is impossible to suppose that
Congress in passing these laws could have intended to . . . enable [the patentee] to
exercise political power . . . .” Id. at 198. The Court also opined whether Congress could
empower an individual to impair the powers of either the legislative or executive
branches. Id.
30
Id. at 198 (stating holding). The Court added “that the use of such improvement . . .
while she is coming into or going out of a port of the United States, is not an
infringement . . . provided it was placed upon her in a foreign port, and authorized by the
laws of the country to which she belongs.” Id. at 198–99.
31
See id. at 198.
32
235 U.S. 641 (1915).
33
Id. at 650 (stating that plaintiff could not add Canadian sales to calculation of
damages). The defendant did not make the drills. Id.
34
Id. at 642–43 (stating facts). The patent pertained to improvements on commonly
used grain drills called “shoe-drills.” Id.
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Defendant, a wholesaler of agricultural implements, purchased and
resold drills in the U.S. and Canada “embodying substantially the
same improvements.”35 The trial court enjoined defendant from
any further sales and awarded plaintiff nominal damages, which
the court of appeals affirmed.36
The Supreme Court held that plaintiff could not recover any
profits or damages of drills sold in Canada because the patent only
conferred on the plaintiff rights “confined to the United States and
its Territories . . . .”37 The Court added that infringement “cannot
be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”38 The
Court distinguished an earlier case finding liability for foreign
sales because here, the defendant did not make the infringing
drills.39
B. Infringement as a Factor in Determining Extraterritorial Effect
Courts often evaluate the type of infringement when
determining whether to give extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent
law. In 1952, Congress enacted Title 35 of the United States Code,
which is the basis for current U.S. patent law.40 35 U.S.C. § 271
35

Id. Manufacturer of infringing drills settled with plaintiff prior to this case. Id.
Interestingly, although the Court held the plaintiff deserved more than nominal damages,
the Court agreed with the lower courts’ justification for ruling that the defendant did not
willfully infringe the patent because the patent at issue was not for a “new and operative
grain-drill, but only for particular improvements in a type of grain-drill then in use and
well known.” Id. at 644–45 (emphasis added).
36
Id. at 643 (stating procedural history). The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
award of nominal damages because: 1) the patent was an improvement of a common
drill; 2) marketability of the drill did not depend on the improvement; 3) plaintiff did not
show defendant’s profits resulted from the improvement; and 4) plaintiff did not show
other data essential to assessing damages sustained from the infringement. Id. at 643–44.
37
Id. at 650 (stating scope of patent holder rights). The Court remanded the case for
more factual findings to determine a reasonable approximation of damages because the
defendant sold over 2500 drills, and “[t]he patent was valid and the invention
meritorious.” Id. at 650–51 (describing why plaintiff was entitled to more than nominal
damages).
38
Id. at 650.
39
Id. (citing Goulds’ Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881)) (discussing that the
defendant manufactured the infringing products in the United States).
40
See Patent Laws, Excerpted from General Information Concerning Patents print
brochure, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/laws.htm (last visited Jan.
12, 2007).
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defines infringement.41 Some provisions of § 271 define direct
infringement and other provisions of the statute define indirect
infringement.42 Some provisions of § 271 explicitly provide for
extraterritorial effect, while other provisions of the statute remain
exclusive to acts occurring within the United States.43 In addition
to § 271, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) provides
another forum for redress to plaintiffs who suffer damages from
the importation of infringing goods.44
Direct infringement is defined by §§ 271(a), 271(f), and
271(g).45 Section 271(a) pertains to actual infringement done
within the U.S.46 Section 271(f) pertains to exportation of goods
for infringement outside the U.S.47 Section 271(g) pertains to
importation of goods made by patented processes.48 This Note will
focus on the Federal Circuit’s recent interpretations of §§ 271(a)
and 271(f), however brief discussions of other sections are
provided.
1. Section 271(a)
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) addresses direct infringement and does not
have any explicit extraterritorial reach. Section 271(a) defines
infringement as the following actions done without authority:
“mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or sell[ing] any patented
invention, within the United States or import[ing] into the United
41

35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
Id. Sections 271(a), 271(f), and 271(g) prohibit direct infringement. Id. §§ 271 (a),
(f), (g). Sections 271(b) and 271(c) prohibit indirect infringement. Id. §§ 271 (b), (c).
Indirect infringement includes induced and contributory infringement. Id.
43
Sections 271(f) pertains to active supplying of goods outside the U.S. Section 271(g)
pertains to importation of goods made outside the U.S., but the method of manufacture
(outside the U.S.) was with a patented process. Id. §§ 271 (f), (g). Section 271(a) has no
express extraterritorial effect. Id. § 271(a).
44
Anne Elise Herold Li, Note, Is the Federal Circuit Affecting U.S. Treaties? The ITC,
§ 271(g), GATT/TRIPS & the Kinik Decision, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 601, 611 (2006). For discussion on ITC, see infra Part I.B.3.a.
45
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(a), (f), (g) (2000).
46
Id. § 271(a) (stating infringer “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells . . . within the
United States . . . .”).
47
Id. § 271(f) (stating infringer “supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United
States . . . .”).
48
Id. § 271(g) (stating infringer “imports into the United States . . . a product . . . made
by a process patented in the United States . . . .”).
42
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States . . . .”49 The principal limitation of § 271(a) is territoriality.
Section 271(a) clearly requires that the listed activities occur
within the United States. The difficult issue for courts to determine
is whether an activity is actually within the United States.50 For
example, the Federal Circuit has approached the “use” prong of
§ 271(a)51 with two distinct analyses: (1) user-oriented analysis,
and (2) control-oriented analysis.52 The user-oriented analysis
focuses on whether the alleged infringer used the patented
invention within the United States.53 The control-oriented analysis
focuses on whether the infringer controlled the patented invention
from within the United States.54
a) User-Oriented Analysis
The following cases highlight the user-oriented analysis of
§ 271(a) by focusing on the situs of “use” or manufacture. The
cases are also important for their analysis of combination patents.55
In Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,56 the Supreme Court
did not consider making and exporting components of a
combination invention territorial subject matter because the
defendant did not make nor use the claimed invention within the
United States under § 271(a).57 The defendant manufactured and
49

Id. § 271(a).
See Yar Chaikovsky, Globalization, Technology without Boundaries & the Scope of
U.S. Patent Law, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 95, 99 (2005).
51
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). Other prongs of § 271(a) include: making, offering to
sell, selling, and importing. See id.
52
See Chaikovsky, supra note 50, at 98–99.
53
See id. at 99. The user-oriented analysis flows from the Supreme Court analysis in
Deepsouth, a case that dealt with the export of components of a product. See id.
54
See id. The control-oriented analysis flows from a series of lower court cases that
dealt with subject matter that extended beyond U.S. borders such as international radar
systems. See id.
55
Combination patents are patents that cover an operable machine or assembly.
Combination patents do not protect individual components used to make the operable
machine or assembly, unless the components are combined to make the operable machine
or assembly. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
56
406 U.S. 518 (1972).
57
Id. at 527–28 (stating holding). The Court held making and exporting components
for a shrimp deveining machine did not infringe the plaintiff’s patent because the
combination patent only covered the operational whole assembly and not the individual
components. Id. at 528.
50
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exported components for a shrimp deveining machine.58 If final
assembly occurred within the United States (i.e., the components
combined), the product would have infringed the plaintiff’s
patent.59 Nevertheless, the district court held that “making,” under
35 U.S.C. § 271(a), in the context of combination patents did not
include mere manufacture of components.60 The district court
refused to enjoin Deepsouth Packing (“Deepsouth”) from
exporting such components.61 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower
court.62 In doing so, the Fifth Circuit departed from other Circuits’
precedents by following the spirit of the Patent Act and capturing
conduct purely conceived to circumvent U.S. patent law.63
Although the Supreme Court recognized the Fifth Circuit’s
intention,64 the Supreme Court confined plaintiff’s rights to those
sprouting from the patent statute.65 The Court emphasized that
58

Id. at 523 (stating facts).
Id. (stating facts). Defendant, Deepsouth, did not dispute infringement for making
and selling completed deveiners in the United States, nor did Deepsouth dispute damages
or injunction against further manufacturing and sales of deveiners in the United States.
See id. n.5. Deepsouth requested modification of the injunction against exporting
deveiner components to foreign costumers who intended to complete assembly outside
the United States. Id. at 523–24. The Court noted that plaintiff’s invention included a
“slitter” and “tumbler” both of which were combination patents, “‘[n]one of the parts
referred to are new, and none are claimed as new; nor is any portion of the combination
less than the whole claimed as new . . . . And this combination . . . is the thing
patented.’” Id. at 520–21 (quoting Prouty v. Ruggles, 16 Pet. 336, 341 (1842)).
60
See id. at 524–25 (stating district court ruling).
61
Id. at 525 (stating district court ruling). Although combination may be predictable,
the Court noted that “‘[i]t may be urged that . . . [this] result is not logical . . . . But it is
founded on twin notions that underlie the patent laws. One is that a combination patent
protects only the combination. The other is that monopolies . . . are not viewed with
favor.’” Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 310 F. Supp. 926, 929
(E.D. La. 1970))
62
Id.
63
See id. The Supreme Court relayed the sentiment behind the Fifth Circuit’s panel
opinion: “[the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits] ‘worked themselves into . . . a
conceptual box’ by adopting ‘an artificial, technical construction’ of the patent laws.” Id.
(quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d 936, 938–39 (5th Cir.
1971)).
64
Id.
65
Id. at 526 (describing 35 U.S.C. § 271 as the only source of authority that could give
plaintiff a right to suppress Deepsouth from exporting deveiner components). The Court
dismissed a theory of contributory infringement because there was no evidence of direct
infringement inside the United States. Id. (describing prerequisite for application of
35 U.S.C. § 271(c)).
59
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infringement, as defined by § 271(a), clearly did not include
making or using a patented invention outside the United States.66
Thus, the Court ruled that in order for plaintiff to recover, the
plaintiff must show defendant made, used, or sold “the patented
product within the bounds of this country.”67 Plaintiff argued that
Deepsouth sold the patented invention, but the Court reduced the
sales question to a manufacturing question.68 The Court held that
Deepsouth did not manufacture the patented invention because “a
combination patent protect[ed] only against the operable assembly
of the whole and not the manufacture of its parts.”69 In support of
its ruling to deny the plaintiff a right to suppress Deepsouth’s
extraterritorial activity, the Court reiterated the essence of Brown
v. Duchesne, “Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial
effect . . . and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to
such control over our markets.”70
Congress later passed § 271(f), making it an infringement to
export components for completed assembly abroad. For discussion
on subsequent cases dealing with § 271(f) see infra Part I.B.2.
Deepsouth is still the basis for interpreting combination patents.71

66

Id. at 527.
Id. (describing plaintiff’s burden for relief). To prevail plaintiff must show direct
infringement as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). Id.
68
Id. (describing that manufacture was a necessary preceding step to selling the
invention). The Court asked, “did Deepsouth ‘make’ (and then sell) something
cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it ‘make’ (and then sell)
something that fell short of infringement?” Id.
69
Id. at 528. The Court dismissed the Fifth Circuit’s view that “‘substantial
manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’ constitute[d] direct
infringement . . . .” Id. (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 443 F.2d 936,
938–39 (5th Cir. 1971)). The dissent criticized the majority opinion for constructing
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) too narrowly and such a narrow construction would unfairly “reward
the artful competitor . . . .” Id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 531 (describing presumption against extraterritorial effect and suggesting that
appropriate route to patent protection in other countries is through acquisition of patents
in those countries) (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (citations
omitted)).
71
See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘No
wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His monopoly does not
cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements . . . to form the invention.’” (quoting
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972))).
67
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In Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp.,72 the Federal
Circuit did not consider testing components of a combination
patent territorial subject matter because the defendant did not test
nor use the claimed combination invention within the United
States, under § 271(a).73 The defendant tested components of a
battery testing system within the United States and exported such
components to Mexico, but never used the entire system within the
United States.74 The plaintiff’s patent claimed the system and
method of using the system.75 The district court granted summary
judgment for defendant.76
The Federal Circuit, citing Deepsouth, distinguished “use” of
components from “use” of a combination invention comprising
those components.77 The court stated that although testing
components constituted use of those components under § 271(a),
the plaintiff did not claim the components rather the plaintiff
claimed the entire combined system.78 Thus, the court held the
defendant did not use the claimed invention, under § 271(a).79
However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings on
§ 271(f).80
b) Control-Oriented Analysis
The following cases highlight the control-oriented analysis of
§ 271(a) by focusing on the situs of “control” over the invention.
In Decca Ltd. v. United States,81 the Court of Claims considered a
72

245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The court affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and
remanded a lower court ruling. Id. at 1365. The court affirmed on the § 271(a) issue, but
remanded on the § 271(f) issue. Id.
73
Id. at 1366–67. The Federal Circuit held that testing components of a combination
invention within the United States did not constitute “use,” under § 271(a), of the claimed
combination invention. Id.
74
Id. at 1365–66.
75
Id. at 1365 (stating that the system monitors and warns operator when battery
capacity falls below an acceptable capacity).
76
Id. at 1365–66.
77
Id. at 1366.
78
Id. at 1366–67.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 1368–69. For discussion on the court’s analysis of § 271(f), see infra
Part I.B.2.
81
544 F.2d 1070 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
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transnational navigation system territorial subject matter because
the U.S. Government used the invention within the United States,
under § 271(a).82 The Government set up a navigation system with
three broadcast stations located in Hawaii, North Dakota, and
Norway.83 The plaintiff’s patent covered a system that included
broadcasting, receiving, and analyzing signals to identify the
location of ships and aircraft.84 The lower court determined the
location of “use,” under § 271(a), by analyzing the locations of
control and beneficial use, thus forming the basis for “controloriented” analysis.85 The court held that the Government infringed
plaintiff’s patent because the control point was within, and benefits
went to, the United States.86
The Court of Claims endorsed the lower court’s control point
and beneficial use analysis.87 The court emphasized that an
invention that “cannot be confined to one country” should not be
“without any territoriality merely because it operate[d] in more
than one country, and at sea.”88 The court considered the home
territory of the invention as the place where the invention was
controlled.89 The court noted that the Government controlled and
monitored the navigation system from within the United States, as
well as synchronized all stations to master stations located within

82

Id.
Id. at 1081.
84
Id. at 1077, 1083. The lower court emphasized that the patent focused on reception
of signals and not generation of signals. The lower court stated that had the scenario
been different, e.g., the patent covered generation of the signals, then the Norwegian
station would have been beyond reach of U.S. patent law. Id. See also Chaikovsky, supra
note 50, at 99–100.
85
Id. at 1082–83. The lower court emphasized that its ruling rested on the
“combination of circumstances” and not “any one factor.” Id. at 1083. The lower court
also emphasized that the benefit of the system was within the United States because the
Government owned all the components of the navigation system. Id.
86
Id. (stating lower court holding).
87
See id. at 1075. In recognition of the lower court’s opinion, the Court of Claims
added to its opinion the entire lower court opinion. Id. at 1075–98.
88
Id. at 1074.
89
See id. “[T]he location of the whole for purposes of the United States Patent Law is
where the ‘master’ station or stations are, which is in the United States of America. . . .”
Id.
83

PIERSON_FORMATTED_032607

2007

4/2/2007 12:57:30 PM

EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. PATENT LAW

665

the United States.90 The court held that the location of control for
the navigation system was within the U.S., and thus the navigation
system was territorial subject matter, under § 271(a).91 The Court
of Claims left open the question of whether there is a legal fiction
that cloaked United States flagged ships at sea with territoriality
for purposes of U.S. patent law.92
The next case established that even though an essential
component is located in the United States that fact alone is
insufficient to establish territoriality.93 In Freedom Wireless, Inc.
v. Boston Communications Group, Inc.,94 the District Court of
Massachusetts did not consider a transnational system territorial
subject matter because the defendant did not use the invention
within the United States, under § 271(a).95 Defendant Rogers
Wireless (“Rogers”), a Canadian wireless phone service,
contracted with codefendant Boston Communications Group
(“BCG”), a U.S. company, to provide certain prepaid billing
services.96 Although all of Rogers’ customers, receiving towers,

90

Id. “[D]efendant established through the use of atomic clocks . . . the necessary
synchronization of that station and part of that activity occurred in this country. Further,
it is from the United States all actions are taken to ensure synchronizations of the
transmissions of that station with those in the United States.” Id. at 1082–83.
91
Id. The Court of Claims agreed with the analysis in Rosen v. NASA, in which the
Patent Office Board of Patent Interferences found that a space satellite system was
reduced to practice inside the United States because the satellite was controlled from
inside the U.S. Id. at 1074 (citing 152 U.S.P.Q. 757 (BNA) (Ct. Cl. 1966)). The lower
court also distinguished Deepsouth because use of the completed shrimp deveining
invention occurred outside the U.S., unlike the navigation system that the Government
used and benefited from. Id. at 1081.
92
See id. at 1072–73. The Court of Claims rejected the lower court’s analysis that
found territoriality on ships and aircraft that flew the U.S. flag because it was debatable
theory. Id.
93
See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11
(D. Mass. 2002).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 18. The court held the defendant did not use the infringing wireless phone
service within the United States, as required by § 271(a), because the control point of the
service was outside the United States. Id.
96
Id. at 13. BCG provided Rogers with the technology required to implement prepaid
calling services. Id. When a prepaid customer attempted to place a call, certain
information, including caller identity and location, was transmitted to BCG’s system and
routed through its database, “which had current information relating to the caller’s
prepaid account balance . . . .” Id. at 13–14. The system “determine[d] the cost of the
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and phone switches, as well as most of BCG network nodes, were
located in Canada, BCG’s main database was located in the U.S.97
Plaintiff patentee sued Rogers and BCG, among others, for
infringement of its prepaid billing service.98 Rogers moved for
summary judgment, asserting that the court lacked personal
jurisdiction and that Rogers did not use the patented invention
within the United States as required by § 271(a).99
The district court began its analysis with the requirements for
infringement—Rogers must have “made, used, offered to sell, or
sold a patented invention within the United States.”100 The
plaintiff asserted that Rogers relied on BCG’s database, which was
located within the U.S., and thus Rogers used the patented
invention within the U.S.101 The court inquired whether Rogers’
use of the BCG database in the U.S. constituted “use” within the
United States.102 The court noted two cases that dealt with
transnational systems and reached different territorial conclusions.
In Decca, the Court of Claims held that a transnational navigation
system satisfied the territoriality requirement of § 271(a) because
the system was controlled from within the United States.103 On the
other hand, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, the United
States Court of Federal Claims held that a satellite system did not
satisfy § 271(a) because the system was controlled from outside
requested call, calculate[d] the maximum duration for the call, and sen[t] this information
back” to Rogers’s network. Id. at 14.
97
Id. at 14.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 15 (describing requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). The district court
emphasized that the Federal Circuit has interpreted § 271(a) to exclude acts wholly done
outside the United States. Id. (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d
1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 52 F.3d 1026,
1033 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). The district court also noted that the Supreme Court has held that
rights of a patentee remain “confined to the United States and its territories.” Id. (citing
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972)).
101
Id. The plaintiff emphasized the essential nature of the BCG database to Rogers’
system. Id.
102
Id. at 15–16.
103
Id. at 16. In Decca, the Court of Claims held that a global navigation system was
used within the United States despite one broadcast station in Norway because the system
was controlled from within the U.S. Id. (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d
1070, 1074 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
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the United States.104 The court held that even though the BCG
database was essential, it was not the control point for Rogers’
wireless phone system.105 Rather, Rogers controlled its system
from within Canada, and therefore Rogers did not use the system
within the United States.106
2. Section 271(f)
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) also addresses direct infringement, but
unlike § 271(a), it has explicit extraterritorial reach. In 1984, in
response to the Supreme Court ruling in Deepsouth, Congress
enacted § 271(f).107 Section 271(f)(1) prohibits supplying goods to
actively induce infringement outside the United States.108 Section
271(f)(2) prohibits supplying goods with the knowledge and
intention of infringement outside the Unites States.109 Thus,
§ 271(f) expanded direct infringement to include exportation of
104

Id. at 16–17. In Hughes, the court held that a satellite system was not used within the
United States because the satellite never entered the U.S., no direct control of the satellite
originated in the U.S., and the control point was outside the U.S. Id. (citing Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States, 20 Fed. Cl. 197, 242–43 (1993)). The district court also
noted that the Goddard Space Center, the only part of the satellite system in the United
States, functioned merely as a communications relay link and not a control point. Id. at 17
(citing Hughes, 20 Fed. Cl. at 243). The U.S. Court of Federal Claims was created in
1992 and is a successor of the original Court of Claims.
105
Id. at 17 (stating that although the BCG database was essential it did not direct,
control, or monitor the wireless phone system).
106
Id. at 18. The court also noted that Rogers’ wireless system “was a Canadian system
that happened to extend into the United States, not a domestic system that happened to
extend into Canada.” Id.
107
Pellegrini v. Analog Device, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing 130
Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)). In Deepsouth, the Supreme Court held that exportation of
components intended for combination abroad did not violate the combination patent
covering the device because the completed device was not made or used within the U.S.
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). For discussion on
Congress’s response to Deepsouth, see infra Part I.D.
108
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000). “Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of components of a
patented invention . . . to actively induce the combination of such components outside the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred
within the United States . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
109
Id. § 271(f)(2). “Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States any component of a patented invention . . . knowing that such
component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be combined
outside the United States . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

PIERSON_FORMATTED_032607

668

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/2/2007 12:57:30 PM

Vol. XVII

components inducing or intending combination of such
components to make a patented invention outside the United
States.110 The Federal Circuit has held that § 271(f) applies to
supplying both tangible and intangible products.111 The Federal
Circuit has also held that § 271(f) applies to device claims, but not
process claims.112
In Waymark Corp., the Federal Circuit considered exporting
components of a combination invention territorial subject matter
even though the invention was never completed because § 271(f)
did not require actual combination.113 The defendant exported
components but never completed assembly of the claimed
invention.114 The lower court held defendant did not infringe
under § 271(f) because defendant never made the invention and
thus, “[t]here can be no contributory infringement [under
§ 271(f)(2)] without the fact or intention of direct infringement.”115
Focusing on the legislative history, the Federal Circuit found
that “[Section] 271(f)(2) d[id] not incorporate the doctrine of
contributory infringement” because § 271(f)(2) lacked specific
language requiring it,116 and § 271(f)(2) only required intent to
combine the components of an alleged infringing device.117 The
court found that the legislative history behind § 271(f) did not
show any language requiring actual combination.118 The Federal
Circuit distinguished § 271(c), the statute for contributory
110

Both subsections require the alleged infringer to directly “suppl[y] or cause to be
supplied” goods outside the U.S. Id. §§ 271(f)(1), 271(f)(2).
111
See Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117 (construing language of § 271(f) to mean actual
components of an invention); Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325,
1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing that intangible software code is a “component” of a
computer product for purposes of § 271(f)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005).
112
See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1322–24 (discussing that
§ 271(f) does not apply to process claims), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).
113
Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001). “The
statute does not require actual assembly.” Id. The court affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part,
and remanded a lower court ruling. Id. at 1365.
114
Id. at 1365.
115
Id. at 1367. The lower court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of
§ 271(f)(2). Id. Contributory infringement is a form of indirect infringement and covered
by 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Indirect infringement is discussed infra Part I.B.4.
116
Id. at 1368.
117
Id. at 1367–68 (describing a facial inspection of the statutory language).
118
Id. at 1368.
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infringement, from § 271(f) because § 271(c) contained language
requiring proof of direct infringement.119 Thus, the court held
§ 271(f)(2) did not require actual combination of physical
components and remanded for further inquiry on whether
defendant intended combination abroad.120
In Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.,121 the Federal Circuit did
not consider export of instructions for producing an invention
abroad territorial subject matter because § 271(f) required that the
components of the invention physically emanate from within the
United States.122 Defendant Analog Devices, Inc. (“Analog”), a
U.S. corporation, manufactured circuits exclusively outside the
U.S. and sold most of these circuits to foreign customers.123 The
plaintiff sued Analog for direct infringement and induced
infringement.124 Analog filed a motion for partial summary
judgment with respect to foreign sales.125 The district court, noting
U.S. patent law did not have extraterritorial effect, granted partial
summary judgment in favor of Analog on the issue of foreign sales
and the plaintiff appealed this ruling.126
The Federal Circuit inquired whether § 271(f)(1) applied to
“products manufactured outside the United States and never
shipped to or from the United States.”127 Plaintiff asserted that
119

Id.
Id.
121
375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
122
Id. at 1117 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)). The court held that manufacturing
directives sent from the United States did not constitute supplying the patented invention
in or from the U.S., as required by § 271(f)(1). Id.
123
Id. at 1115 (stating facts).
124
Id. at 1114.
125
Id. at 1115.
126
Id. (discussing procedural history). The district court rejected plaintiff’s assertion
that since defendant’s headquarters were located in the United States and order
instructions emanated from there, the chips should be considered to have been supplied
from the U.S. Id.
127
Id. at 1116 (discussing defendant’s main argument). The court also noted the
significance of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), “[It] was enacted in the wake of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Deepsouth in which the Court acknowledged that
unauthorized manufacturers . . . could avoid liability . . . by manufacturing the unassembled
components of those products in the United States and then shipping them outside the
United States for assembly. Congress enacted § 271(f) in order to close that loophole.”
Id. (citations omitted).
120
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Analog supplied or caused to be supplied the infringing circuits, as
required by § 271(f)(1), by controlling the production within the
U.S. through accepting orders and relaying production instructions
to all foreign manufacturing sites.128 First, the court focused on the
clear meaning of § 271(f)(1) by stating it only applied to
“components of a patent[ed] invention . . . physically present in the
United States and then either sold or exported ‘in such a manner as
to actively induce the combination . . . .’”129 Second, the court
stated that § 271(f)(1) “focuse[d] on the location of the accused
components, not the accused infringer.”130 Thus, the court held
Analog was not liable under § 271(f)(1) for foreign sales because
the components were never shipped from the United States and
because sending instructions did not constitute physical shipment
of components.131
In Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,132 the Federal
Circuit considered exporting software code territorial subject
matter because § 271(f) included intangible inventions.133 The
defendant, Microsoft, exported master disks with source code for
its operating system to foreign computer manufacturers for
purposes of copying code to computers for sale outside the United
States.134 The plaintiff’s patent claimed a browser function that
128

Id. Plaintiff listed other characteristics of control: “Analog is incorporated in the
United States and has executive, marketing, and product line responsibilities for
[infringing circuits]; that Analog conceived and designed the [infringing circuits]; . . . and
that Analog receives purchase orders from and invoices customers worldwide for
[infringing circuits] and increases production levels for [infringing circuits] in response to
those purchase orders.” Id.
129
Id. at 1117 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)).
130
Id. (noting precedent). In North American Philips v. American Vending Sales, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit held that infringement occurred where the infringing act “‘[was]
committed and not where the injury [was] felt.’” Id. (quoting 35 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
131
Id. at 1117–18 (stating holding). The court also emphasized that “‘the right
conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its territories,
and infringement of this right cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign
country.’” Id. at 1119. (quoting Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S.
641, 650 (1915)).
132
399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005).
133
Id. at 1339. The court held § 271(f) included software code on a master disk because
271(f) encompassed “every form of invention eligible for patenting . . . .” Id.
134
Id. at 1331.
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defendant’s operating system allegedly infringed.135 The district
court determined “source code is the legal equivalent of a piece of
computer hardware and that ‘in a legal sense, a[sic] source code is
a made part of a computer product.’”136 Therefore, the district
court considered source code a “component” for the purposes of
§ 271(f).137
The Federal Circuit treated intangible inventions, under
§ 271(f), no differently than structural inventions.138 The court
rejected the defendant’s assertion that Congress intended
“components,” under § 271(f), to mean “physical components” as
used in Deepsouth because the legislative intent behind § 271(f)
was to close loopholes, not preserve them.139 Relying on the
legislative history, the court held that the language of § 271(f) did
not require components of a patented invention be tangible.140
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that
“components,” under § 271(f) included software code.141
In NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion,142 the Federal Circuit did
not consider a transnational process territorial subject matter
because § 271(f) did not apply to process inventions.143 The
legislative history behind § 271(f) supported the court’s assertion

135

Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1331–32.
137
Id. at 1332. The Federal Circuit reiterated the lower court’s statement that, for legal
purposes, in the field of computer technology the terms “software” and “hardware” are
used interchangeably. Id. at 1339.
138
Id. at 1339. The Federal Circuit emphasized that it was sound policy to counsel
“against varying the definition of ‘component of a patented invention’ according to the
particular form of the part under consideration. . . .” Id. at 1339–40.
139
Id. at 1340. Microsoft asserted that because 271(f) was Congress’ response to
Deepsouth, the language in 271(f) should be narrowly confined to the situation in
Deepsouth, for example, the export of physical components. Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 1341. On October 31, 2005, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Order List:
546 U.S. (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/
courtorders/103105pzor.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
142
418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
143
Id. at 1322–23. Since the court found infringement for the method claims under
§ 271(a), the court did not consider the method claims under § 271(f). Id. at 1321. For
discussion on facts of the case, see infra Part II.A.1.
136
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that Congress did not focus on process claims.144 The court
refused to equate the sale of handheld devices to supplying
“components of a patented invention” for purposes of § 271(f)
because a user did not combine the “components” to complete a
patented process outside the United States.145 Thus, the court held
§ 271(f) did not apply to process claims.146
3. Section 271(g)
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) also addresses direct infringement and has
explicit extraterritorial reach. In 1988, the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act added § 271(g).147 Section 271(g) prohibits
unauthorized importation, use, selling or offering to sell “within
the United States a product which is made by a process patented in
the United States . . . .”148 Thus, § 271(g) provides patent
protection to patent holders of a process by disallowing would-be
infringers from conducting the process outside the U.S. and then
importing the goods resulting from the process.149

144

Id. at 1322 (citing S. REP. NO. 98-663, at 3, 6 (1984) and 130 Cong. Rec. 28, 069
(1984)). As stated earlier, Congress enacted 271(f) in response to Deepsouth, which
involved a combination patent and not a process patent. Id.
145
Id. “While it is difficult to conceive of how one might supply . . . a substantial
portion of the steps of a patented method . . . it is clear that RIM’s supply of the
BlackBerry handheld devices and [related] products to its customers in the United States
is not the statutory ‘supply’ of any ‘component’ steps for combination into NTP’s
patented methods.” Id.
146
Id. at 1322–23.
147
See Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(discussing legislative history behind 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)). The Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act was the result of a policy trend started in the 1970’s to increase
America’s competitiveness in the global economy. See Kent H. Hughes, Facing the
Global Competitiveness Challenge, ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECH. ONLINE,
http://www.issues.org/21.4/hughes.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
148
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). “Whoever without authority imports into the United
States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by
a process patented in the United States . . . .” Id.
149
Because of cheaper labor costs overseas, without any laws to prohibit him, a wouldbe infringer could conduct a process overseas and import the results of the process and
sell the goods more cheaply and undercut the value of the patent holder’s process patent,
let alone circumvent the exclusive right of the patent all together.
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Section 271(g) only applies to tangible products.150 The
Federal Circuit has interpreted “made,” in § 271(g), to mean
“manufactured.”151 Liability only attaches if the process directly
manufactured the product.152 Mere predicate processes to identify
the product are insufficient for liability.153 Determination of
whether a product was “made by” a patented process to satisfy
§ 271(g) is a judicial question.154 Alternatively, with respect to
imported products a patentee can seek redress from the
International Trade Commission (“ITC”).155
In Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,156 the Federal
Circuit did not consider importation of a drug identified by a
patented process territorial subject matter because the patented
process did not make the imported drug under § 271(g).157
Defendant Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Housey”) held patents
for “a method of screening” substances.158 Bayer AG (“Bayer”)
sought a declaratory judgment against Housey for patent invalidity,
unenforceability, and non-infringement.159 In its counterclaim of
infringement, Housey alleged Bayer used the patented screening
process to identify the pharmacological properties of Bayer’s
drug.160 The district court dismissed Housey’s counterclaim of
infringement for failure to state a claim and Housey appealed.161
The Federal Circuit inquired whether “made,” as used in
§ 271(g), meant “manufactured.”162 The court examined other
150

See Bayer AG, 340 F.3d at 1377 (holding that § 271(g) only applies to tangible
articles of manufacture).
151
Id.
152
See id.
153
Id.
154
Id. (discussing Congress’s intention for courts to decide proximity question on a
“case-by-case basis”).
155
For discussion of ITC, see infra Part I.B.3.a.
156
See 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
157
Id. at 1377–78 (stating that importation of a drug identified by a patented process
was not manufactured by a patented process, as required by § 271(g), because the process
merely produced information regarding the drug and not the drug itself).
158
Id. at 1369.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 1370.
162
Id. at 1371–72 (describing disputed statutory language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)).
Housey conceded that if “made” meant “manufactured,” then Bayer’s proposition would
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provisions of the patent statute to resolve the meaning of the term
“made.”163 One provision described a person who used “a
patented process to ‘produce’ a product as a ‘manufacturer.’”164
Another provision described a person who made a product as “a
person then engaged in the manufacture of a product . . . .”165 The
court noted that the statutory exceptions within § 271(g) connoted
a physical structure because practically speaking only physical
structures can be “materially changed,” or “become a trivial or
nonessential component of another product . . . .”166 The court
noted that Congress enacted § 271(g) to supplement remedies
provided for by the ITC against importation of goods made abroad
by patented processes,167 which Congress considered inadequate
for owners of process patents.168 The legislative history suggested
that Congress was only concerned with “articles” produced from
processes.169 Thus, the court held “made” meant “manufactured”
and production of information, for screening purposes or
otherwise, was not covered by § 271(g).170
In NTP, the Federal Circuit did not consider a transnational
method territorial subject matter because § 271(g) did not apply to
process inventions.171 The court, relying on Bayer, held § 271(g)

be correct that “information is not a manufactured product” and thus § 271(g) would not
be applicable. Id.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 1372 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2000)) (describing statutory
language in similar section of Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 which
enacted § 271(g)).
165
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 287(b)(4)(A) (2000)).
166
Id. at 1372–73 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(1) (2000)) (Section 271(g) provides the
following exceptions for a product made by a patented process if “(1) it is materially
changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component
of another product”).
167
Id. at 1373 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000)).
168
Id. at 1373–74 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-60 at 8–9).
169
Id. at 1374. A proposed precursor of § 271(g) contained language declaring
infringement as importation of “‘a product manufactured by a patented process.’” Id.
(quoting S. REP. NO. 98-663 at 30 (1984)) (emphasis in original).
170
Id. at 1377 (stating holding).
171
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The
court probably did not analyze the system claims under § 271(g), for the same reason it
did not analyze the system claims under § 271(f). For discussion on facts of the case, see
infra Part II.A.1.
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did not apply to production of intangible items.172 The court noted
that “transmission of information” like the “production of
information,” at issue in Bayer, did not constitute a tangible result
and therefore § 271(g) is inapplicable to plaintiff’s process
claim.173 Since the process claim merely transmitted information it
did not produce tangible results, thus § 271(g) did not apply to the
asserted process claim.174
a) International Trade Commission
Section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act,175 defined unfair methods
of competition in importation as:
The importation into the United States, the sale for
importation, or the sale within the United States after
importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of
articles that—(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United
States patent . . . or (ii) are made, produced, processed, or
mined under, or by means of, a process covered by the
claims of a valid and enforceable United States patent.176
The ITC investigates violations of § 337.177 The ITC conducts
proceedings that complement federal judicial proceedings.178
Although the ITC cannot award damages, the ITC can issue
temporary or permanent exclusion orders, which are comparable to
a preliminary or permanent injunction from a federal district
court.179 The primary purpose of either an injunction or an
exclusion order is to stop the continued infringement of the patent
holder’s patent. The Federal Circuit has recognized that § 337 may
have wider scope regarding tangible articles than § 271(g), but
172

Id. at 1323.
Id.
174
Id.
175
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2004).
176
Id. at (a)(1)(B).
177
Bryan Farney, An Overview of Section 337 Actions in the ITC, Part I,
http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Aug/17/128707.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2007).
178
See Li, supra note 44, at 611.
179
Farney, supra note 177; see also Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (discussing enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g)). “Congress
recognized the availability of redress from the ITC, but noted that the remedies available
thereunder were insufficient to fully protect the owners of process patents.” Id.
173
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Congress believed § 337 did not provide enough protection for
owners of process patents.180
Section 337 is limited to infringement through importation.181
The major benefit to the ITC is speed—actions proceeding through
the ITC are quicker than actions proceeding through federal district
court.182
The major limitation of an ITC proceeding is
uncertainty—the ITC retains discretion to conduct an investigation,
therefore a litigant’s grievance may not be heard.183 If the ITC
accepts the complaint, the ITC gives the case to an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) to conduct discovery and issue a ruling.184
The ITC also has discretion regarding whether or not to review the
ALJ ruling.185 The President of the United States can also veto an
ITC ruling for policy reasons.186
Parties can request a rehearing with the ITC or appeal an ITC
ruling in the Federal Circuit.187 A difference which may play a
crucial role in a litigant’s decision to pursue an ITC proceeding is
that the ITC has nationwide in rem jurisdiction, rather than the
mere in personam jurisdiction of a federal district court.188 In rem
jurisdiction is preferable to in personam jurisdiction in patent
infringement cases because often times the patent holder merely
wishes to stop the infringement and in rem jurisdiction pertains to
the actual imported goods, while in personam jurisdiction requires
service upon the actual importers and infringers which is more

180

Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1374 (stating that “Congress recognized the availability of redress
from the ITC, but noted that the remedies available thereunder were insufficient to fully
protect the owners of process patents.”).
181
See Farney, supra note 177.
182
Id. See also Li, supra note 44, at 611 (stating that speed is a “key feature” of ITC
proceedings).
183
See Farney, supra note 177 (comparing ITC proceedings to the automatic review of
complaints filed with the district court).
184
Id. § II.
185
Id.
186
Li, supra note 44, at 616; Farney, supra note 177, § II.J.1. Although rarely used,
President Reagan vetoed an exclusion order that he believed would unfavorably affect too
many people and the computer trade industry. Farney, supra note 177, § II.J.1.
187
Farney, supra note 177, § II.K (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1994)). “The appeal
must take place within sixty days of the end of the time allotted for presidential review.”
Li, supra note 44, at 616.
188
See Farney, supra note 177, § II.M.1.
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costly and time-consuming.189 This difference is also beneficial in
that it precludes would-be importers from reconstituting their
companies to circumvent in personam court orders.190
4. Indirect Infringement
In addition to §§ 271(a), 271(f), and 271(g), which prohibit
direct infringement or overt acts constituting infringement,
§§ 271(b) and 271(c) prohibit indirect infringement. Section
271(b) prohibits the active inducement of infringement.191 Section
271(c) prohibits contributory infringement:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component . . . knowing
[that the component is] . . . especially adapted for use in an
infringement of [a machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or process] patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.192
In other words, proffering a component suitable for nothing
other than an infringing purpose is infringement according to
§ 271(c). For either section to have extraterritorial reach, a direct
infringement must occur within the United States.193
Contributory infringement, § 271(c), is broader in scope than
§ 271(b).194 The language of § 271(c) states, “[w]hoever offers to
189
See Li, supra note 44, at 612 (discussing the advantages of the ITC having in rem
jurisdiction in addition to in personam jurisdiction).
190
See id. (discussing the difficulty of getting in personam jurisdiction over foreign
importers that do not “reside” or have “minimum contacts” within any jurisdiction);
Farney, supra note 177, § II.M.1 (discussing the practice of importing infringing articles
through an unnamed company).
191
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000). “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.” Id.
192
Id. § 271 (c).
193
See Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255, 257
(2005) (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)). Because indirect infringement requires direct infringement, this paper will
focus on case law addressing direct infringement only.
194
See Donald Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 603, 615. In 1994, Congress amended
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sell or sells . . . or imports . . . a component . . . .”195 An example
of § 271(c)’s broad scope can be seen by the following
hypothetical.196 A patent covers the combination of components A
and B. Defendant then sells B to consumers and consumers
combine B with A.
Consumers consummate the direct
infringement.197 It is not feasible to sue the consumers, but the
patent holder can sue the defendant for contributory
infringement.198 A limitation on contributory infringement is that
it requires knowledge and willfulness, which are not requirements
for direct infringement.199
C. Claim Type as a Factor for Determining Extraterritorial Effect
Courts often evaluate the form of patent claim being infringed
when determining whether to give extraterritorial effect to U.S.
patent law. Utility patents provide four different types of claims:
“process, machine, manufacture, or compositions of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”200 The type of claim
can determine whether a court will consider the invention
territorial subject matter.201 In a recent Federal Circuit case, the
court reached different conclusions on territoriality after analyzing
the patentee’s system claims and process claims.202
§ 271(c) to expand its territorial scope by adding the language, “offers to sell or sells . . .
or imports . . . .” Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
195
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
196
Chisum, supra note 194, at 615.
197
Id.
198
Id. The patent holder must apply the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. See id.
199
Id. at 616.
200
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). In addition to the four statutory categories of claim types an
inventor may also claim a product by describing the process used to create the product,
called “product-by-process” claim which is a creature of the Patent Office and the courts.
Gregory S. Maskel, Note, Product-by-Process Patent Claim Construction: Resolving the
Federal Circuit’s Conflicting Precedent, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
115, 117 (2006).
201
See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006). “Not only will the analysis [of extraterritoriality]
differ for different types of infringing acts, it will also differ as the result of differences
between different types of claims.” Id.
202
See id. at 1317 (describing different conclusions for § 271(a) analysis regarding
system claims and method claims).
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In NTP, the Federal Circuit distinguished the impact of
§ 271(a) on system claims and process claims.203 At issue was the
Blackberry e-mail system, which included components located in
Canada.204 The court held that for purposes of “use,” under
§ 271(a), plaintiff’s system claims encompassed the Blackberry
system, but plaintiff’s method claims did not encompass the
Blackberry method.205 A sample of the plaintiff’s system claims is
claim 150 from U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 (“the ’592 patent”):
150. In a communication system comprising a wireless
system which communication system transmits electronic
mail inputted to the communication system from an
originating device . . . and after reception of the electronic
mail by the destination processor, information contained in
the electronic mail and an identification of a wireless
device in the wireless system are transmitted by the
wireless system to the wireless device and from the
wireless device to one of the mobile processors, the
wireless device and one mobile processor . . . .206
A sample of plaintiff’s process claims is claim 311 of U.S.
Patents No. 6,067,451 (“the ’451 patent”).207
311. A method of transmitting and distributing inputted
information through a distributed system, comprising:
originating electronic mail from a processor in a
communication system which electronic mail includes
(a) an address of an interface . . . (b) an identification of a
RF receiver in the RF system to receive the inputted
information, and (c) the inputted information to be
delivered to the RF receiver; receiving the originated
electronic mail . . . ; adding information to the inputted
203

See id. at 1317–18.
Id. at 1287–90 (describing Blackberry system).
205
Id. at 1317–18.
206
U.S. Patent No. 6,317,592 claim 150 (filed Dec. 6, 1999).
207
One of the disputed process claims in NTP was claim 313. NTP, 418 F.3d at 1291.
However, claim 313 is a dependent claim. See U.S. Patent No. 6,067,451 claim 313 (filed
Sep. 28, 1998). “A method in accordance with claim 311 wherein . . . .” Id. For purposes
of contrasting the language of system and process claims, the author has chosen to
produce the independent claim upon which claim 313 depends, claim 311. Id.
204
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information and the identification of the at least one
designated RF receiver . . . ; broadcasting the inputted
information and the identification of the RF receiver . . . ;
receiving the broadcasted inputted information and the
identification of the RF receiver with the RF receiver; and
storing the received inputted broadcast information in a
memory and processing the information stored in the
memory . . . .208
The court’s decision to apply different extraterritorial character
to the plaintiff’s different types of claims turned on the difference
between using a device and using a process “within the United
States,” as required by § 271(a).209 The Federal Circuit noted that
a process is nothing more than a series of steps.210 To use a
process “within the United States,” an alleged infringer must
complete every step of the patented process “within the United
States.”211
Thus, the Federal Circuit seemingly gave
extraterritorial effect to the plaintiff’s system claims and not its
method claims because the court distinguished between “use” of a
system and “use” of a process. Rather than merely extending
protection capriciously, the court expanded or contracted its notion
of territorial subject matter based on the type of claim.
D. Interplay between the Courts and Congress
Congress has legislated changes to the Patent Act when it
disagreed with a Supreme Court interpretation of the Patent Act or
when a case illuminated a loophole in the Patent Act. For
example, § 271(f) was Congress’s response to a loophole in the
patent laws at the time of Deepsouth.212 In Deepsouth, the
Supreme Court strictly interpreted § 271(a) and refused to give the
208

U.S. Patent No. 6,067,451 claim 311 (filed Sep. 28, 1998).
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317–18. (“[T]he distinction between a claim to a product, device,
or apparatus, all of which are tangible items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a
series of acts or steps. . . . [A process] consists of doing something, and therefore has to
be carried out or performed.” (quoting In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2002))).
210
Id. at 1318.
211
Id.
212
See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing
130 Cong. Rec. H10525 (1984)).
209
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statute extraterritorial effect.213 The Court held that the defendant
who exported components and induced their combination outside
the U.S. did not infringe the combination patent on the invention
because the defendant did not make the invention within the
U.S.214 In response to this ruling, Congress enacted § 271(f) which
expanded the definition of infringement to include exportation of
components with intent to complete assembly of a patented device
outside the United States.215 Despite the enactment of § 271(f),
Deepsouth is still the cited authority for interpreting combination
patents.216
Recently, the Federal Circuit addressed the scope of § 271(f).
In 2004, the Federal Circuit held that instructions disseminated
from defendant’s headquarters in the United States did not apply to
§ 271(f) because the defendant did not export any physical
components.217 In 2005, the Federal Circuit ruled against
Microsoft in two cases holding that § 271(f) applied to exported
software code used to make duplicates overseas.218
E. Jurisdiction
35 U.S.C. § 293 allows a plaintiff to bring suit in the District
Court of the District of Columbia against a foreign, nonresident
patentee.219 Section 293 stipulates that nonresident patentees may

213

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). “With all
respect, this seems to me too narrow a reading of 35 U.S.C. § 154 and 271(a). . . . [T]he
result is unduly to reward the artful competitor . . . .” Id. at 532–33 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
214
Id. at 528–29 (holding that a combination patent only covers the specified
combination and not its individual components).
215
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
216
See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“No
wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His monopoly does not
cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements . . . to form the invention.” (quoting
Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529)).
217
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1117–18.
218
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 568 (2005); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
219
See Chad A. Schiefelbein, Accepting an Exception to the “Government Contracts
Exception” of the District of Columbia’s Long-Arm Statute, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 1023,
1060–61.
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designate “a person residing within the United States” to receive
process or notice.220 Section 293 also provides:
If the person designated cannot be found . . . or if no person
has been designated, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons
shall be served by publication or otherwise as the court
directs. The court shall have the same jurisdiction to take
any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it
would have if the patentee were personally within the
jurisdiction of the court.221
Section 293 serves as a long-arm statute providing plaintiff’s at
least one forum for relief.222
II. DIVINING THE EDGES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH
As the global economy spreads and multinational companies
continue to merge, borders become irrelevant, which will spur
disputes over territorial subject matter for U.S. patent law. Two
cases exemplify the difficult task of defining the edges of
extraterritorial reach while recognizing the Supreme Court’s
maxim against extending extraterritorial effect to U.S. patent law.
The NTP case is a unique example of the Federal Circuit
seemingly injecting extraterritorial reach into § 271(a), yet not
running afoul of the Supreme Court’s proscription because the
Federal Circuit’s analysis focused on specific claim types.223 On
the other hand, AT&T v. Microsoft224 is an example of the Federal
Circuit actually injecting limitless extraterritorial reach into
§ 271(f) and violating the Supreme Court proscription because the

220

35 U.S.C. § 293 (2000).
Id.
222
See Schiefelbein, supra note 219, at 1060–61.
223
See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(discussing the impact of different infringing acts and claim types on analysis of
§ 271(a)), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).
224
414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
221
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Federal Circuit’s analysis encompassed acts wholly done outside
the U.S.225
Part A of this section discusses NTP and the Federal Circuit’s
two-factor analysis of § 271(a) problems, as well as the inherent
differences between “use” of a process and “use” of a system. Part
B of this section discusses AT&T and its seemingly boundless
approach to analyzing § 271(f) problems pertaining to intangible
property.
A. NTP v. Research In Motion
In NTP, the Federal Circuit analyzed the claims surrounding
the popular Blackberry wireless e-mail system, including patents
containing process and system claims.226 The court did not
consider a transnational process claim territorial subject matter
because the defendant did not “use” the completed process
invention within the United States, under § 271(a).227 However,
the court considered the transnational system claim territorial
subject matter because the defendant “used” the system invention
within the United States, under § 271(a).228 Defendant Research In
Motion (“RIM”), a Canadian corporation, set up a wireless e-mail
system with a “relay” station located in Canada.229 Plaintiff owned
225

Id. at 1372–73 (Rader, J., dissenting). See also Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline
Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (stating that infringement “cannot be predicated of
acts wholly done in a foreign country.”).
226
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1287–90 (describing Blackberry system).
227
Id. at 1318. The court held that the processes integrated into the Blackberry wireless
e-mail system were not “used” within the United States, under § 271(a), because not all
of the steps in the processes were completed within the United States. Id. The court
analyzed infringement on two types of patent claims: process claims and system claims.
Id. at 1287.
228
Id. at 1317. The court held that Blackberry system was “used” within in the United
States, under § 271(a), because Blackberry customers manipulated the handheld device in
the U.S. Id.
229
Id. at 1290. The Blackberry system is a “push” e-mail system which instantly
delivers e-mail to recipients, rather than recipient having to initiate a connection to the
server and “pull” e-mail messages from the server. Id. at 1287–88. The system
incorporates a desktop utility that receives e-mail addressed to user, connects via the
internet to the relay station in Canada, and transmits the e-mail to the relay station. Id.
The relay station wirelessly transmits the e-mail message to the user’s handheld device.
Id. When the user initiates an e-mail with the handheld device the e-mail message
follows the reverse path. Id.
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patents with process claims and systems claims covering the
processes and systems employed by RIM and incorporated into the
Blackberry e-mail system.230 The district court held RIM infringed
both plaintiff’s process and system claims.231
1. “Use” of a Process under § 271(a)
The Federal Circuit evaluated RIM’s “use,” under § 271(a), of
the process claims and system claims separately and focused on the
situs of infringement.232 The court noted that “patent infringement
occurs where the offending act is committed and not where the
injury is felt.”233 The court recognized a distinction between “use”
of a patented process and “use” of a patented system.234 The court
held infringement of a process required completion of the entire
process within the United States—“[b]ecause a process is nothing
more than the sequence of actions of which it is comprised, the use
of a process necessarily involves doing or performing each of the
steps recited.”235 Since the defendant completed one of the
necessary steps in Canada, the defendant did not complete all the
steps of the patented process within the United States, and thus, the
defendant did not “use” the claimed process, under § 271(a).236
The court examined the alternative prongs of § 271(a) and, relying

230

Id. at 1288–89.
Id. at 1287.
232
Id. at 1316. “The situs of the infringing act is a ‘purely physical occurrence.’” Id.
(quoting N. Am. Philips Corp. v. Am. Vending Sales, Inc. 35 F.3d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
233
Id. (quoting Philips, 35 F.3d at 1579).
234
Id. at 1317. The court distinguished the analysis in Deepsouth, stating “[a]lthough
the Supreme Court focused on the whole operable assembly of a system claim for
infringement in Deepsouth, there is no corresponding operable assembly of a process
claim.” Id. at 1317–18. See also In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(recognizing distinction between device claims and method claims).
235
NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318 (“A method or process consists of one or more operative
steps, and accordingly, ‘[i]t is well established that a patent for a method or process is not
infringed unless all steps or stages of the claimed process are utilized.’” (quoting Roberts
Dairy Co. v. U.S., 530 F.3d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1976))).
236
Id. (stating holding). As a consequence to finding no direct infringement of the
process claim, the defendant is not liable for contributory or induced infringement of the
process claim. Id.
231
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on the legislative history, held that in the context of process claims,
§ 271(a) was limited to “use.”237
2. “Use” of a System under § 271(a)
Contrary to the court’s finding for process claims, the court
found territoriality for the system claims because the system was
“used” within the United States, under § 271(a).238 Focusing on
the situs of the infringement, the court applied the analysis from
Decca, “[t]he use of claimed system under § 271(a) is the place at
which the system as a whole is put into service, i.e., the place
where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the
system obtained.”239 RIM argued that since the relay station was
located in Canada, the system was not subject to NTP’s claims.240
The court distinguished the role of the relay station and the role of
RIM’s customers.241 The relay station was merely a component of
the Blackberry system, while the Blackberry users manipulated the
handheld devices, and initiated and received e-mails within the
United States, thus the users controlled and benefited from the
system within the United States.242 Therefore, the court held the
situs of the infringement of the system claims was within the
United States and thus, RIM infringed NTP’s system claims.243
The Federal Circuit has developed a unique two-factor analysis
of § 271(a) problems: a) the type of infringement and b) the type of
patent claim. However, the following questions remain: First, is it
237

Id. at 1319 (“The Senate Report explains, ‘Under our current patent laws, a patent on
a process gives the patentholder the right to exclude others from using that process in the
United States without authorization from the patentholder. The other two standard
aspects of the patent right—the exclusive right to make or sell the invention—are not
directly applicable to a patented process.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-83, at 30 (1987))).
For discussion on the court’s analysis of process claims under § 271(f) and § 271(g), see
supra Part I.B.2 and Part I.B.3.
238
Id. at 1317.
239
Id. (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1083 (Ct. Cl. 1976)).
240
Id. (referring to RIM’s appeal of jury finding that system claims occurred within the
United States).
241
Id.
242
Id. For a similar conclusion that an essential component is insufficient to find
territoriality, see Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp.
2d 11, 17 (D. Mass. 2002).
243
See NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317.
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appropriate to treat various claims differently under U.S. patent
law? Second, with respect to “use” of transnational systems, under
§ 271(a), how much is enough?
B. AT&T v. Microsoft
In AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,244 the Federal Circuit
considered foreign replication of software code originally exported
from the United States territorial subject matter because the
original software code was a component supplied for subsequent
identical software inventions, under § 271(f).245 Defendant
Microsoft exported disks with master versions of its software for
purposes of replication outside the United States.246 The plaintiff’s
patent claimed a speech codec247 that defendant’s software
allegedly infringed.248 At trial Microsoft moved in limine to
exclude evidence of foreign sales of its software and the parties
converted the motion into partial summary judgment.249 The lower
court held software was a “component,” under § 271(f), and
foreign copies of the software “were not shielded from § 271(f) in
light of the statute’s purpose of prohibiting the circumvention of
infringement through exportation.”250
The Federal Circuit focused on the ease of replication in
software distribution and interpreted § 271(f) in the light of
“ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication

244

414 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 476 (2006) (mem.).
See id. at 1370. The court held § 271(f) liability extended to copies of software made
abroad because § 271(f) expressly described that supplying and copying, in terms of
software distribution, “is subsumed in the act of ‘supplying’ . . . .” Id. The court affirmed
the lower court’s ruling, pursuant to Eolas v. Microsoft, that the master version of the
software was a component. Id. at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
399 F.3d 1325, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)).
246
Id. at 1368.
247
A “codec” is a software program that codes and decodes signals. Coding compresses
the signal and decoding expands signal to original form. Id. at 1328 n.1.
248
Id. at 1368.
249
Id. Microsoft’s motion in limine contained two arguments: 1) “component,” under
§ 271(f), did not include intangible software; and 2) “supplied,” under § 271(f), did not
apply because the software was installed on foreign-assembled computers abroad. Id.
250
Id. The lower court’s reasoning that software is a “component” is similar to the
lower court’s reasoning in Eolas. See Eolas, 399 F.3d at 1331–32.
245
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Congress intended them to bear some different import.”251 The
court emphasized that a single copy of software uploaded to a
server could “allow any number of exact copies to be downloaded,
and hence ‘supplied.’”252 The Federal Circuit rejected the
defendant’s assertion that § 271(f) liability should only extend to
each exported disk because it “fail[ed] to account for the realities
of software distribution.”253 The Federal Circuit emphasized that it
would be contrary to the legislative intent behind § 271(f) to allow
advances in technology to circumvent § 271(f).254 Thus, the
Federal Circuit held copying of software abroad is tantamount to
supplying for purposes of § 271(f).255
Judge Rader, author of the Eolas opinion, wrote a stronglyworded dissent in which he equated copying with manufacturing
and accused the majority of “provid[ing] extraterritorial
expansion” of U.S. patent law by penalizing acts wholly done
outside the United States.256 The Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari.257
The question remains, with respect to “supplying” of intangible
goods, under § 271(f): Where is the line separating the reach of
U.S. patent law and acts done wholly outside the U.S.?
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Part A of this section discusses the benefits of the two-factor
analysis employed by the Federal Circuit in NTP and suggests
approaches to the in-between cases. Part B of this section
251

AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1369 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
252
Id. at 1370.
253
Id. (stating the cost-saving nature of software distribution realized by shipping
minimal goods and replicating products on site). The Federal Circuit refused Microsoft’s
reading of § 271(f) because it would lead to absurd results. Id.
254
Id. at 1371 (“It would be unsound to construe a statutory provision that was
originally enacted to encourage advances in technology by closing a loophole, in a
manner that allows the very advances in technology thus encouraged to subvert that
intent.”).
255
See id. at 1370.
256
Id. at 1372–73 (Rader, J., dissenting).
257
See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
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discusses the problematic analysis of the Federal Circuit in AT&T
and suggests an alternative approach.
A. Double-Barreled Approach is Appropriate for § 271(a)
The two-factor analysis employed by the Federal Circuit in
NTP for § 271(a) is appropriate because the analysis captures
activities that are substantially within the U.S. while not
overextending the reach of U.S. patent law. In NTP, RIM
allegedly infringed two different claim types: process claims and
system claims.258 The Federal Circuit found territoriality for the
system claims and not the process claims because the court held
that the concept of “use” of a system differed from the concept of
“use” of a process, under § 271(a).259 The court held close to the
abstract idea of a process: it is merely a series of steps.260 The
court found, as a matter of law, that RIM could not have used the
process invention within the United States because it did not
complete all the necessary steps of the process within the United
States.261 However, the court took a broader analytic approach to
the “use” of a system, under § 271(a).262 Consequently, with
respect to “use” under § 271(a), the court took a holistic approach
to territoriality regarding the system claims and a bright-line
approach regarding the process claims.263 Therefore, some subject
matter is ripe for litigants to debate, like “use” of a system, under
§ 271(a), and other subject matter is not in play because of brightline rules, like “use” of a process, under § 271(a).264

258
See NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1288–89 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).
259
See id. at 1317.
260
See id. at 1318.
261
See id.
262
See id. at 1317. The Federal Circuit applied a beneficial use and control-oriented
analyses to find RIM “used” the Blackberry system within the United States, under
§ 271(a). Id.
263
See id. at 1316–18.
264
See id. The bright-line rule for “use” of process patents precludes beneficial use and
control-oriented analyses.
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1. How Much is Enough?
With respect to “use” of transnational systems, under § 271(a):
How much is enough? Freedom Wireless and NTP both dealt with
transnational wireless communication systems but the court in
Freedom Wireless did not find territoriality and the court in NTP
did.265 These two cases are on opposites sides of the spectrum.
For example: If a transnational system has a bulk of its network
outside the United States, then Freedom Wireless would apply and
there is no territoriality.266 If a transnational system has a bulk of
its network inside the United States, then NTP would apply and
there is territoriality.
But what if the transnational system has equal parts outside and
inside the United States? The control-oriented analysis may
provide an answer, but large multinational corporations may divest
control to several points, making the location of control fertile
ground for contention. A litigant can thrust and parry arguments
pinpointing the location of control to sway the court in finding or
not finding territoriality. Another possible tactic is to analyze
territorial impact factors in a balancing test to quantify the
economic impact of the invention on U.S. markets, thus avoiding
statutory formalities and preserving the essence of territorial patent
protection.267
B. Unlimited Liability for Intangible Property is Inappropriate
for § 271(f)
With respect to the export of intangible property, under
§ 271(f), one question arises: When does infringement end and
wholly foreign activity begin? The Federal Circuit has recently
answered that for infringement of intangible property, it does not
end. In AT&T, the Federal Circuit held that foreign replication of
265

See Freedom Wireless, Inc. v. Boston Commc’ns Group, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18
(D. Mass. 2002) (stating holding); NTP, 418 F.3d at 1317 (stating holding).
266
See Freedom Wireless, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating holding).
267
See Elizabeth M. N. Morris, Territorial Impact Factors: An Argument for
Determining Patent Infringement Based Upon Impact on the U.S. Market, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 351, 352 (2006). Morris argues that the territorial
impact factors are: “(1) control, (2) ownership, and (3) beneficial use of the allegedly
infringing product.” Id. at 368.
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software is territorial subject matter.268 AT&T drew its analysis
from Eolas, but Eolas did not address whether foreign replication
of software was territorial or not, it merely characterized software
code as components of software inventions.269 Judge Rader,
author of Eolas, vigorously dissented in AT&T fearing the “parade
of horribles” that may befall the software industry as a result of the
majority’s holding.270 At bottom, the majority’s holding converted
AT&T’s U.S. patent into a global patent.271 Further, the AT&T
panel departed from the Supreme Court’s maxim in Deepsouth:
“[W]e . . . insist on a clear congressional indication of intent to
extend the patent privilege . . . .”272 The Supreme Court has
recently granted certiorari and the boundless tide of extraterritorial
reach the AT&T opinion has unleashed may finally recede.273
The Solicitor General opines that the tide should turn.274 In an
amicus brief, the Solicitor General points out the contradictory
holdings of AT&T and Pellegrini.275 The Federal Circuit in
Pellegrini held that § 271(f) only applied to components
“physically present in the United States and then either sold or
exported.”276 In addition, AT&T contradicts Pellegrini on yet
another level.
Should Microsoft be liable for copies manufactured overseas,
then liability would either be: (a) unlimited; or (b) limited to the
copies it knew of or induced to be made overseas. I suggest these

268

AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
269
Id. at 1369 (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 568 (2005)) (discussing whether software is a
“component” under § 271(f)).
270
AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1372 (Rader, J., dissenting).
271
See id. at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting). The majority opinion “suggests that AT&T
might otherwise have no remedy for infringement occurring wholly outside the United
States. AT&T, however, is not left without remedy. AT&T can protect its foreign
markets from foreign competitors by obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.” Id.
272
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972).
273
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
274
See generally Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae, Microsoft Corp. v.
AT&T Corp., 2006 WL 2805326.
275
See id. at 13 (quoting Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1117 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
276
Id.

PIERSON_FORMATTED_032607

2007

4/2/2007 12:57:30 PM

EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF U.S. PATENT LAW

691

two answers because endless copies can be reproduced, but the
exporter could only intend a certain amount to be copied. Either
the exporter is liable for every copy subsequently made or he is
liable for those copies he intended, expected or foresaw to be
produced. The first proposition is absurd and therefore should be
dismissed for regulating wholly foreign activities.277 The second
proposition should also be dismissed because it is tantamount to a
tenuous control-oriented analysis.278 Pellegrini stood for the
proposition that export of instructions to induce infringement
abroad was not within the scope of § 271(f) because the defendant
did not supply any physical components.279 The Pellegrini court
dismissed any notion of a control-oriented analysis to substitute for
the physical supply requirement of § 271(f) problems.280
Therefore, the AT&T court’s imposition of liability on Microsoft
was inappropriate because it either lays Microsoft open to infinite
liability or the AT&T court contradicts itself by employing a weak
control-oriented analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there is a traditional presumption against
extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law, Congress has exercised its
right to legislate extraterritorially by enacting § 271(f) and
§ 271(g). Courts have also given U.S. patent law extraterritorial
effect by contextualizing the infringement statutes to suit specific
types of patent claims and new technologies, such as software and
networks.281 As technology progresses and the global economy
spreads, territorial questions will continue to grow between the
cracks in the concrete of U.S. patent law. Through contextual
analytic approaches, such as the two-factor analysis employed by
277

See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915)
(stating infringement “cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.”)
278
See Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118 (holding dissemination of instructions did not
satisfy physical supply requirement of § 271(f)). See also supra note 127 and
accompanying text.
279
Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1118.
280
Id.
281
See AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 467 (2006) (mem.).
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the NTP court, courts can preserve the spirit of U.S. patent law and
not violate proscriptions against extending extraterritorial reach to
U.S. patent law.282 Courts should also recognize that in keeping
with the spirit of the U.S. patent law, they should observe the
longstanding principle that U.S. patent law does not cover acts
occurring wholly outside the U.S. and avoid decisions that lead to
absurd conclusions.
The best alternative to boundless and absurd conclusions is for
the courts to take a conservative approach and wait for legislative
action. It worked for the critics of Deepsouth.

282

See generally NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1174 (2006).

